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Abstract. In this paper I generalize the landmark Levy-Solovay Theorem [Lev-
Sol67], which limits the kind of large cardinal embeddings that can exist in a small
forcing extension, to a broad new class of forcing notions, a class that includes
many of the forcing iterations most commonly found in the large cardinal litera-
ture. The fact is that after such forcing, every embedding satisfying a mild closure
requirement lifts an embedding from the ground model. A consequence is that
such forcing can create no new weakly compact cardinals, measurable cardinals,
strong cardinals, Woodin cardinals, strongly compact cardinals, supercompact
cardinals, almost huge cardinals, or huge cardinals, and so on.
Small forcing in a large cardinal context, that is, forcing with a poset P of cardi-
nality less than whatever large cardinal κ is under consideration, is today generally
looked upon as benign. This outlook is largely due to the landmark Levy-Solovay
theorem [LevSol67], which asserts that small forcing does not affect the measurability
of any cardinal. (Specifically, the theorem says that if a forcing notion P has size
less than κ, then the ground model V and the forcing extension V P agree on the
measurability of κ in a strong way: all the ground model measures on κ generate as
filters measures in the forcing extension, the corresponding ultrapower embeddings
lift uniquely from the ground model to the forcing extension and all the measures
and ultrapower embeddings in the forcing extension arise in this way.) Since the
Levy-Solovay argument generalizes to the other large cardinals whose existence is
witnessed by certain kinds of measures or ultrapowers, such as strongly compact
cardinals, supercompact cardinals, almost huge cardinals and so on, one is led to the
broad conclusion that small forcing is harmless; one can understand the measures
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2in a small forcing extension by their relation to the measures existing already in the
ground model.
Historically, the Levy-Solovay theorem addressed Go¨del’s hope that large car-
dinals would settle the Continuum Hypothesis (ch). Go¨del, encouraged by Scott’s
[Sco61] theorem showing that the existence of a measurable cardinal implies V 6= L,
had hoped that large cardinals would settle the ch in the negative. But since one
can force the ch to hold or fail quite easily with small forcing, the conclusion is in-
escapable that large cardinals simply have no bearing whatsoever on the Continuum
Hypothesis.
Since that time, set theorists have developed sophisticated tools to combine the
two central set theoretic topics of forcing and large cardinals. The usual procedure
when forcing with a large cardinal κ whose largeness is witnessed by the existence
of a certain kind of elementary embedding j : V → M is to lift the embedding
to the forcing extension j : V [G] → M [j(G)] and argue that this lifted embedding
witnesses that κ retains the desired large cardinal property in V [G]. In this way, one
is led to consider how a measure µ in the ground model V can relate to a measure
ν in the forcing extension V [G]. The measure µ may extend to ν in the simple
sense that µ ⊆ ν or it may lift to ν when the ground model ultrapower jµ : V →M
agrees with the larger ultrapower jν : V [G]→M [jν(G)] on the common domain V .
Expressed in this terminology, the Levy-Solovay theorem asserts that after small
forcing every measure in the ground model both lifts and extends to a measure in
the forcing extension and, conversely, every measure in the extension both lifts and
extends a measure in the ground model.
The truth, however, is that in the large cardinal context most small forcing is,
as it were, too small. Rather, one often wants to perform long iterations going
up to and often beyond the large cardinal κ in question. With a supercompact
cardinal κ, for example, one often sees reverse Easton κ-iterations along the lines
of Silver forcing [Sil71] or the Laver preparation [Lav78]. What we would really like
is a generalization of the Levy-Solovay theorem that would allow us to understand
and control the sorts of embeddings and measures added by these more powerful
and useful forcing notions.
Here, I prove such a generalization. For a vast class of forcing notions, in-
cluding the iterations I have just mentioned, the fact is that every embedding
j : V [G] → M [j(G)] in the extension that satisfies a mild closure condition lifts
3an embedding j : V → M from the ground model. In particular, every measure
in V [G] concentrating on a set in V extends a measure on that set in V . From
this general fact, I deduce that forcing of this type creates no new weakly compact
cardinals, measurable cardinals, strong cardinals, Woodin cardinals, supercompact
cardinals, or huge cardinals and so on.
The class of forcing notions for which the theorem applies is quite broad. All
that is required is that the forcing admit a gap at some δ below the cardinal κ in
question in the sense that the forcing factors as P ∗ Q˙ where P is nontrivial, |P| < δ
and Q˙ is ≤δ-strategically closed. (A forcing notion is ≤δ-strategically closed when
the second player has a strategy enabling her to survive through all the limits in the
game in which the players alternately play conditions to build a descending (δ+1)-
sequence through the poset, with the second player playing at limit stages.) The
Laver preparation, for example, admits a gap between any two stages of forcing.
Indeed, in the Laver preparation, the tail forcing is fully directed closed, not merely
closed or strategically closed. And the same holds for many of the other reverse
Easton iterations one commonly finds in the literature. Moreover, in practice one
can often simply preface whatever strategically closed forcing is at hand with some
harmless small forcing, such as the forcing to add a single Cohen real, and thereby
introduce a gap at δ = ω1. Further, because Q˙ can be trivial, gap forcing includes
all small forcing notions. Examples of useful gap forcing notions are abundant.
An embedding j : V →M is amenable to V when j ↾A ∈ V for any A ∈ V .
Gap Forcing Theorem. Suppose that V [G] is a forcing extension obtained by
forcing that admits a gap at some δ below κ and j : V [G]→M [j(G)] is an embed-
ding with critical point κ for which M [j(G)] ⊆ V [G] and M [j(G)]δ ⊆ M [j(G)] in
V [G]. Then M ⊆ V ; indeed M = V ∩M [j(G)]. If the full embedding j is amenable
to V [G], then the restricted embedding j ↾ V : V → M is amenable to V . And if
j is definable from parameters (such as a measure or extender) in V [G], then the
restricted embedding j ↾ V is definable from the names of those parameters in V .
A weaker precursor to this theorem appeared in [Ham98a]1. The Gap Forcing
Theorem here answers all of the open questions asked in [Ham98a] and establishes a
strong generalization of the Gap Forcing Conjecture of that paper, which asserted
that after forcing with a very low gap every supercompactness embedding is the lift
1 The current proof addresses what is probably an inadequate discussion of s¨ in
that proof.
4of an embedding from the ground model. The current theorem implies much more:
any kind of ultrapower embedding is a lift.
In order to avoid confusion on a subtle point, let me remark that given any
embedding j : V [G] → M we can let M = ∪{ j(Vα) | α ∈ ord }, and it is not
difficult to see that j(G) is M -generic, that M = M [j(G)] and moreover that
j ↾ V : V → M . Thus, while the statement of the theorem concerns embeddings of
the form j : V [G]→M [j(G)], this form of embedding is fully general.
For those readers who are not completely familiar with the bizarre sorts of
embeddings j : V [G]→M [j(G)] that can exist in a forcing extension, let me stress
that in general, quite apart from the question of whether j lifts an embedding from
the ground model, one must not presume even that M ⊆ V . For example, if κ is
a Laver indestructible supercompact cardinal in V and we force to add a Cohen
subset A ⊆ κ (by itself, this forcing does not admit a gap below κ), then κ remains
supercompact in the extension V [A], but any embedding j : V [A]→M [j(A)] must
have A ∈ M and therefore M 6⊆ V . The point is that the theorem really does
identify a serious, useful limitation on the sorts of embeddings that exist in a gap
forcing extension.
My proof will proceed through a sequence of lemmas. A variation of the Key
Lemma first appeared in [Ham98a] and [Ham98b] and was subsequently modified and
appealed to in [HamShl98], but to be thorough I include the proof here. Other impor-
tant techniques are adapted from Woodin’s proof of the Levy-Solovay Theorem for
strong cardinals (see [HamWdn]); indeed, Woodin’s techniques are peppered amongst
the proofs of several of the lemmas below, and I could not have proved the theorem
without them.
Let me define that a sequence in a forcing extension is fresh when it is not in
the ground model but all of its proper initial segments are. Thus, it is a new path
through a tree in the ground model.
Key Lemma 1. If |P| ≤ β, Q˙ is ≤β-strategically closed and cof(θ) > β, then
P ∗ Q˙ adds no fresh θ-sequences.
Proof: It suffices to consider only sequences of ordinals. Furthermore, since any
fresh θ-sequence of ordinals below ξ may be easily coded with a fresh binary sequence
of ordinal length ξ · θ, which has the same cofinality as θ, it suffices to prove only
5that no fresh binary sequences are added. So, suppose towards a contradiction that
τ is the P ∗ Q˙-name of a fresh binary θ-sequence, so that

P∗Q˙
τ ∈ 2θˇ & τ |∈ Vˇ & ∀λ < θˇ (τ ↾ λ ∈ Vˇ ).
Since P is nontrivial, by refinining below a condition if necessary we may assume it
adds a new subset of some minimal γ ≤ β, so that for some name h˙:
P h˙ ∈ 2
γˇ & h˙ |∈ Vˇ & ∀α < γˇ (h˙ ↾ α ∈ Vˇ ).
For every condition 〈 p, q˙ 〉 ∈ P ∗ Q˙ let b〈 p,q˙ 〉 be the longest sequence b such that
〈 p, q˙ 〉  bˇ ⊆ τ . Note that cof(θ) > β is preserved by both P and Q.
I claim that a certain weak Prikry property holds, namely, that there is a con-
dition 〈 p, q˙ 〉 such that for for any λ < θ and any stronger condition of the form
〈 p, r˙ 〉 there is an even stronger condition of the form 〈 p, s˙ 〉 that decides τ ↾λ. That
is, below 〈 p, q˙ 〉 the first coordinate need not change in order to decide more and
more of τ . To see why this is so, suppose g ∗ G is V -generic for P ∗ Q˙. For every
λ < θ there is a condition 〈 pλ, q˙λ 〉 ∈ g ∗ G that decides τ ↾ λ. Since cof(θ) > β, it
must be that a single condition p is used for unboundedly many pλ. Thus, in fact,
this condition p could have been used for every λ. So for every λ there is a name
q˙ such that 〈 p, q˙ 〉 ∈ g ∗ G decides τ ↾ λ. By strengthening p if necessary, we may
suppose that this state of affairs is forced by a condition of the form 〈 p, q˙ 〉. What
this means is that for any λ and any stronger 〈 p, r˙ 〉 there is an even stronger 〈 p, s˙ 〉
that decides τ ↾ λ, as I claimed.
Since no condition decides all of τ , it follows from this that for any condition
〈 p, r˙ 〉 ≤ 〈 p, q˙ 〉 there are names r˙0 and r˙1 such that 〈 p, r˙0 〉, 〈 p, r˙1 〉 ≤ 〈 p, q˙ 〉 and
b〈 p,r˙0 〉 ⊥ b〈 p,r˙1 〉.
Now I will iterate this fact by constructing in V a binary branching tree whose
paths represent (names for) the first player’s plays in the game corresponding to
Q˙. Using a name σ˙ that with full boolean value names a strategy witnessing that
Q˙ is ≤β-strategically closed in V P, the basic picture is that while the second player
obeys σ˙, the tree will branch for the first player with moves corresponding to the
conditions r˙i given by the previous paragraph. Specifically, I will assign in V to
each t ∈ 2<γ a name q˙t so that along any branch in 2
γ the condition p forces that the
names give rise to the first player’s moves in a play through Q˙ that accords with the
strategy σ˙. That is, the next move is always below σ˙ of the previous moves. The
6first player begins with q˙∅ = q˙. If q˙t is defined, let r˙t be the name of the condition
obtained by applying the strategy against the play up to this point, i.e. the play in
which the first player plays q˙s for s ⊆ t. By induction, p forces that these conditions
give rise to a play according to σ˙, and so p forces that r˙t is stronger than all q˙s for
s ⊆ t. Now, by the previous paragraph the first player may reply with either q˙tˆ 0
or q˙tˆ 1 chosen so that 〈 p, q˙tˆ i 〉 ≤ 〈 p, r˙t 〉 and b〈 p,q˙tˆ 0 〉 ⊥ b〈 p,q˙tˆ 1 〉. Similarly, if t has
limit ordinal length, then since the strategy is forced to be winning for the second
player, there will be a condition r˙t that is the result of the strategy σ˙ applied to the
previous play 〈 q˙s | s ( t 〉, and we may therefore have the first player choose any
q˙t such that 〈 p, q˙t 〉 ≤ 〈 p, r˙t 〉 in order to continue the iteration. The effects of this
construction are first, that whenever t ⊆ t¯, then 〈 p, q˙t¯ 〉 ≤ 〈 p, q˙t 〉, and second, that
b〈 p,q˙tˆ 0 〉 ⊥ b〈 p,q˙tˆ 1 〉. The map t 7→ q˙t lies in V .
Now suppose that g ∗ G is V -generic below the condition 〈 p, q˙ 〉. In V [g], let
h = h˙g be the new γ-sequence added by P; let qt = (q˙t)g be the interpretation of the
names constructed in the previous paragraph; and let σ = (σ˙)g be the interpretation
of the strategy. By the assumption on h˙, every initial segment t( h lies in V . By
construction, the sequence 〈 qt | t ( h 〉 represents the plays of the first player in a
play that accords with the strategy σ. Thus, since the strategy is winning for the
second player, there is a condition r below all of them (i.e. the γth move). Thus,
r forces that b = ∪t(hb〈 p,q˙t 〉 is a proper initial segment of τ , and consequently
b ∈ V . By construction, however, for any t ∈ 2<γ we know t ⊆ h exactly when
b〈 p,q˙t 〉 ⊆ b, since whenever t ˆ i first deviates from h the construction ensures that
b〈 p,q˙tˆ i 〉 deviates from b. We conclude that h ∈ V , a contradiction. Lemma
Let me now continue with the proof of the theorem. Suppose that V [G] is a
forcing extension obtained by forcing that admits a gap at δ < κ and j : V [G] →
M [j(G)] is an embedding with critical point κ such that M [j(G)] ⊆ V [G] and
M [j(G)]δ ⊆ M [j(G)] in V [G]. Exhibiting the gap, we have V [G] = V [g][H] where
g ∗ H ⊆ P ∗ Q˙ is V -generic for nontrivial forcing P with |P| < δ and Q˙ is ≤δ-
strategically closed. The embedding can therefore be written as j : V [g][H] →
M [g][j(H)]. I may assume that δ is regular, since it might as well be |P|+. Since
the critical point of j is κ, every set in Vκ is fixed by j. It follows that Vκ = Mκ. In
the next few lemmas, I will show even more agreement between M and V .
7Lemma 2. Every set of ordinals σ in V [G] of size δ is covered by a set τ in M ∩ V
of size δ.
Proof: Since σ has size δ, it must be in both V [g] and M [g]. Thus, using the
names in V and M , there are sets s0 ∈ V and s1 ∈ M of size δ such that σ ⊆ s0
and σ ⊆ s1. Iterating this idea, bouncing between sets in M and sets in V , we can
build in V [G] an increasing sequence of sets ~σ = 〈 σα | α < δ 〉 such that σ0 = σ,
α < β → σα ⊆ σβ, and for cofinally many α, σα ∈ V and for cofinally many α,
σα ∈ M . Let τ = ∪~σ. Thus certainly σ ⊆ τ and τ has size δ. It remains to show
τ ∈ M ∩ V . By the strategic closure of Q we know ~σ ∈ V [g], and so it has a name
s˙ ∈ V . Since cofinally often σα ∈ V , there must be conditions in g forcing each
instance of this, but since |P| < δ and δ is regular, a single condition p ∈ g must
work unboundedly often, and decide unboundedly many elements of s˙. Thus, p also
decides the union, and so τ ∈ V . Similarly, by the closure of the embedding it must
be that ~σ ∈ M [j(G)] and consequently by the strategic closure of j(Q) actually
~σ ∈ M [g]. Thus, it has a name t˙ ∈ M , and again because cofinally often σα ∈ M
there must be a single condition p ∈ g deciding unboundedly many many elements
of t˙. Thus, this condition decides the union, and so τ ∈ M , as desired. Lemma
Lemma 3. M and V have the same δ-sequences of ordinals.
Proof: It suffices to show that [ord]δ is the same in M and V . Suppose that
σ ⊆ ord has size δ and σ is in either M or V . By the previous lemma there is a set
τ ∈ V ∩M of size δ such that σ ⊆ τ . In both M and V we may enumerate τ = { βα |
α < γ } in increasing order, where γ = ot(τ) < δ+. Let A = {α | βα ∈ σ }. This set
is definable from σ and τ and therefore must be in either M or V , respectively, as
σ is in either M or V . But since A ⊆ γ, it must be in Vκ = Mκ, and so it is in both
M and V . Thus, σ = { βα | σ ∈ A } is also in both M and V , as desired. Lemma
Lemma 4. M ⊆ V .
Proof: It suffices to show that P (θ)M ⊆ V for every ordinal θ. Suppose A ⊆ θ is in
M . By induction, I may assume that every initial segment of A is in V . If cof(θ) ≥ δ
then A must itself be in V , for otherwise it would be fresh over V , contradicting the
Key Lemma. So we may assume that cof(θ) < δ. Thus, by the distributivity of Q,
it follows that A ∈ V [g], and so A = A˙g for some name A˙ ∈ V . Pick some enormous
ζ and an elementary substructure X ≺ Vζ of size δ containing A˙ and P as well as
every element of P. It follows that g is X-generic, that X[g] ≺ Vζ [g] and furthermore
8that X and X[g] have the same ordinals. Since X ∩ ord is a set of ordinals in V of
size δ, by the previous lemma it must also be in M . And since A ∈ M , it follows
that a = A ∩X is also in M , and so again by the previous lemma, a is in V . Thus,
there is some condition p ∈ g that forces X ∩ A˙ = aˇ. That is to say, p decides A˙(α)
for every α ∈ X. Thus,
X |= ∀α(p decides A˙(α)).
By elementarity, it must be that Vζ also satisfies this, and so p decides A˙(α) for all
α. Thus, A ∈ V , as desired. Lemma
By simply enumerating any set in M , it follows from the previous two lemmas
that M δ ⊆ M in V .
Lemma 5. M = V ∩M [j(G)].
Proof: Since M ⊆ V by the previous lemma it follows that M ⊆ V ∩M [j(G)]. For
the converse, let me first show that any set of ordinals A in both V and M [j(G)]
is in M . Suppose A ⊆ θ and, by induction, all the proper initial segments of A are
in M . If the cofinality of θ is at least δ, then A must be in M because otherwise
it would be a fresh set added by j(G) over M in violation of the Key Lemma. So
I may assume that cof(θ) < δ. Thus, A is the union of a δ-sequence of sets in M .
Since M δ ⊆ M in V , it follows that A is in M , as desired. Suppose now that a is
an arbitrary set in V ∩M [j(G)] and, by ∈ -induction, that every element of a is in
M . It follows that a is a subset of an element b ∈ M . Enumerate b = { bα | α < θ }
in M and observe that it is enough to know that the set A = {α < θ | bα ∈ a } is in
M . But this is a set ordinals in V ∩M [j(G)], and so the proof is complete. Lemma
Lemma 6. If the full embedding j : V [G] → M [j(G)] is amenable to V [G], then
the restricted embedding j ↾ V : V →M is amenable to V .
Proof: Suppose that j : V [G] → M [j(G)] is amenable to V [G]. In order to show
that j ↾ V : V → M is amenable to V , I must show that j ↾ A ∈ V for any A ∈ V .
Using enumerations of the sets in V , it suffices to show that j ↾ θ ∈ V for every
ordinal θ. And to prove this, it suffices to show that j " θ ∈ V for every ordinal θ.
Let A = j " θ, and suppose by induction that every initial segment of A is in V . By
the amenability of the full embedding, we know that A ∈ V [G]. If cof(θ) ≥ δ then A
must be in V for otherwise it would be fresh over V , in violation of the Key Lemma.
So I may assume that cof(θ) < δ. Consequently, by the distributivity of Q, it must
be that A ∈ V [g], and so A = A˙g for some name A˙ ∈ V . Again choose some large ζ
9and X ≺ Vζ of size δ containing A˙ and P as well as every element of P. It follows
that X∩ord = X[g]∩ord. The set X∩ord is a set of ordinals of size δ in V , and
consequently it is in M by the lemma above. Let a = A ∩X = A ∩X[g]. Since this
is a subset of j " θ of size δ < κ, it must be equal to j " b = j(b) for some set b ⊆ θ of
size δ. By the cover lemma above, there is a set c in both M and V such that b ⊆ c
and c has size δ. Now simply compute a = j " b ⊆ (j " c) ∩ X ⊆ (j " θ) ∩ X = a, and
so a = (j " c) ∩ X. But j " c = j(c) ∈ M ⊆ V , and so a is in V . Now, continuing as
in the previous lemma, there must be a condition p ∈ g forcing this. So p decides
A˙(α) for every α ∈ X. By the elementarity of X ≺ Vζ it must be that p decides A˙(α)
for every ordinal α. Thus, A is in V , as desired. Lemma
Lemma 7. If the full embedding j : V [G]→M [j(G)] is definable from parameters
(such as a measure or extender) in V [G], then the restricted embedding j ↾V : V →
M is definable from the names of those parameters in V .
Proof: This follows actually from the previous lemma. Suppose that j : V [G] →
M [j(G)] is definable from the parameter z in V [G]. Thus, there is some formula ϕ
such that j(a) = b exactly when V [G] |= ϕ[a, b, z]. Fix a name z˙ for z. Thus, for
a ∈ V we have j(a) = b exactly when some p ∈ G forces that ϕ(aˇ, bˇ, z˙). Since any
definable embedding is amenable, it follows by the previous lemma that j ↾ Vθ is
in V for every θ. Thus, for every θ there is a condition p ∈ G that forces that the
relation ϕ(aˇ, bˇ, z˙) in V [G] agrees with the relation j(a) = b for a ∈ Vθ and b ∈ Vj(θ).
That is, p forces that the relation ϕ(aˇ, bˇ, z˙) for a and b in the appropriate domain
produces exactly the set j ↾ Vθ. By the Axiom of Replacement, there must be a
single p that works for unboundedly many θ. Thus, for this p we know that j(a) = b
exactly when p forces ϕ(aˇ, bˇ, z˙), for a and b in V . So j ↾ V is definable from z˙ in
V . Lemma
This completes the proof of the theorem. I will nevertheless quickly prove one
additional lemma that will assist in the proofs of the corollaries to come.
Lemma 8. Under the hypothesis of the theorem,
1. If M [j(G)]λ ⊆ M [j(G)] in V [G] then Mλ ⊆ M in V .
2. If Vλ ⊆ M [j(G)] then Vλ ⊆ M .
Proof: For 1, if M [j(G)]λ ⊆ M [j(G)] in V [G] then any λ-sequence of elements
of M that lies in V must lie in V ∩M [j(G)], and consequently in M . For 2, if
Vλ ⊆ M [j(G)] then Vλ ⊆ V ∩M [j(G)] = M . 
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One must take care with strongness embeddings in order to satisfy the closure
hypothesis in the theorem. A cardinal κ is λ-strong when there is an embedding
j : V → M with critical point κ such that Vλ ⊆ M and j(κ) > λ. Let me
define that an embedding j : V → M is β-closed when Mβ ⊆ M . The problem
with strongness embeddings, of course, is that they need not satisfy any degree of
closure. By factoring through by the canonical extender, however, one obtains a
natural embedding, meaning in addition that M = { j(h)(s) | h ∈ V & s ∈ Vλ }.
And for almost every λ these natural embeddings do satisfy the closure hypothesis
of the theorem.
Lemma 9. If κ is λ-strong, then the natural λ-strongness embeddings j : V →M
are κ-closed if λ is a successor ordinal or a limit ordinal of cofinality above κ, and
otherwise they are < cof(λ)-closed.
Proof: It suffices to consider λ > κ. Suppose that j : V → M is a natural λ-
strongness embedding, so that cp(j) = κ, Vλ ⊆ M and M = { j(h)(s) | s ∈ Vλ &
h ∈ V }. In the first case, suppose that λ = ξ + 1 and 〈 j(hα)(sα) | α < κ 〉
is a κ-sequence of elements from M . Since a κ-sequence of subsets of Vξ can be
coded with a single subset of Vξ, it follows that 〈 sα | α < κ 〉 is in M . Also, the
sequence 〈 j(hα) | α < κ 〉 = j(〈 hα | α < κ 〉) ↾ κ is in M . Thus, the sequence
〈 j(hα)(sα) | α < κ 〉 is in M , as desired. For the next case, when λ is a limit ordinal
of cofinality larger than κ, then on cofinality grounds the sequence 〈 sα | α < κ 〉 is
in Vλ, and hence in M , so again 〈 j(hα)(sα) | α < κ 〉 is in M , as desired. Finally,
suppose λ is a limit ordinal and β < cof(λ) ≤ κ. If 〈 j(hα)(sα) | α < β 〉 is a sequence
of elements from M , then again on cofinality grounds we know 〈 sα | α < β 〉 is in
Vλ and hence in M , and so 〈 j(hα)(sα) | α < β 〉 is in M , as desired. Lemma
The consequence of this argument is that except for the limit ordinals of small
cofinality, the Gap Forcing Theorem applies to strongness embeddings.
I would like now to prove a series of corollaries to the Gap Forcing Theorem. I
hope these corollaries tend to show that for a variety of large cardinals the restric-
tions identified in the theorem are severe.
Corollary 10. Gap forcing creates no new weakly compact cardinals. If κ is weakly
compact after forcing with a gap below κ, then it was weakly compact in the ground
model.
Proof: Suppose that κ is weakly compact in V [G], a forcing extension obtained
by forcing with a gap below κ. It follows that κ is inaccessible in V [G] and hence
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also in V . Thus, it remains only to prove that κ has the tree property in V . If T is
a κ-tree in V , then by weak compactness it must have a κ-branch in V [G]. Since
every initial segment of this branch is in V , it follows by the Key Lemma that the
branch itself is in V , as desired. Corollary
Corollary 11. After forcing with a gap below κ, every ultrapower embedding with
critical point κ in the extension lifts an embedding from the ground model, and
every κ-complete measure in the extension that concentrates on a set in the ground
model extends a measure in the ground model.
Proof: I am referring here not just to measures on κ, but to measures on an
arbitrary set D, so that the corollary also covers the cases of, for example, su-
percompactness and hugeness measures. It is a standard fact that any ultrapower
embedding j : V [G]→M [j(G)] by a measure µ in V [G] is closed under κ-sequences
where κ = cp(j). Since the forcing admits a gap below κ, the Gap Forcing Theorem
implies that j : V → M is definable from parameters in V . If µ concentrates on
some set D ∈ V , then since X ∈ µ ↔ [id]µ ∈ j(X), it follows that µ ∩ V ∈ V is a
measure on D in V , and the corollary is proved. Corollary
Corollary 12. Gap forcing creates no new measurable cardinals. If κ is measurable
after forcing with a gap below κ, then κ was measurable in the ground model and
every measure on κ in the extension extends a measure in the ground model.
Proof: This is a special case of the previous corollary. Corollary
As a caution to the reader, let me stress that the corollary does not say that
every ultrapower embedding j : V [G] → M [j(G)] in the extension is the lift of an
ultrapower embedding j ↾V : V →M in the ground model. Rather, one only knows
that the restricted embedding j ↾ V is definable from parameters in V . Indeed, it is
possible to construct an example of a gap forcing extension V [G] with an embedding
j : V [G] → M [j(G)] that is the ultrapower by a normal measure in V [G] but the
restriction j ↾ V is not an ultrapower embedding at all, being instead some kind of
strongness extender embedding.
Corollary 13. Gap forcing creates no new strong cardinals. If κ is λ-strong after
forcing with a gap at δ < κ, and λ is either a successor ordinal or has cofinality
larger than δ, then κ was λ-strong in the ground model.
Proof: Suppose that V [G] is the forcing extension obtained by forcing with a gap
below δ. Lemma 9 shows that if κ is λ-strong in V [G] for such a λ as in the statement
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of the corollary, then there is an embedding j : V [G] → M [j(G) witnessing this
that is closed under δ-sequences. Consequently, by the Gap Forcing Theorem, the
restriction j : V → M is definable from parameters in V , and since Vλ ⊆ M [j(G)],
Lemma 8 implies that Vλ ⊆ M . So κ is λ-strong in V , as desired. Corollary
What we actually have is the following:
Corollary 14. After forcing P of size less than δ, no further ≤δ-strategically closed
forcing Q can increase the degree of strongness of any cardinal κ > δ.
Proof: Suppose that κ is λ-strong in V [g][H], the extension by P∗Q˙, and κ > δ. In
the first case, when λ is either a successor ordinal or a limit ordinal of cofinality above
δ, the previous corollary shows that κ is λ-strong in V and hence also in the small
forcing extension V [g]. For the second, more difficult case, suppose that κ is λ-strong
in V [g][H] and λ is a limit ordinal with cof(λ) ≤ δ. Let j : V [g][H]→ M [g][j(H)]
be a λ-strong embedding by a canonical extender, so that M [g][j(H)] = { j(h)(s) |
s ∈ V [g][H]λ & h ∈ V [g][H] }. Thus, j is the embedding induced by the extender
E = { 〈A, s 〉 | A ⊆ Vκ & s ∈ j(A) & s ∈ V [g][H]λ },
which is a subset of P (Vκ) × V [g][H]λ. This extender is the union of the smaller
extenders E ↾ β = E ∩ (P (Vκ) × V [g][H]β) for unboundedly many β < λ. By the
result of the previous corollary, we may assume that these smaller extenders each
extend a strongness extender in V . Since each of these extenders extends uniquely
to V [g], the small forcing extension, it follows by the strategic closure of Q˙ that
E ∩ V [g] is in V [g] and hence κ is λ-strong in V [g], as desired. Corollary
The two previous results are complicated somewhat by the intriguing possibility
that small forcing could actually increase the degree of strongness of some cardinal.
This question, an unresolved instance of the Levy-Solovay theorem, is raised in
[HamWdn]. One could ask the corresponding question replacing small forcing with
gap forcing, is it possible that forcing with a gap below κ can increase the degree of
strongness of κ? But the truth of the matter is that the previous corollary shows
that if gap forcing P ∗ Q˙ can increase the degree of strongness of a cardinal, then
this increase is entirely due to the initial small forcing factor P. And the only way
this can occur is if a <λ-strong cardinal is made λ-strong for some limit ordinal λ
of small cofinality.
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Corollary 15. Gap forcing creates no new Woodin cardinals. If κ is Woodin after
forcing with a gap below κ, then κ was Woodin in the ground model.
Proof: If κ is Woodin in V [G], then for every A ⊆ κ there is a cardinal γ < κ
that is <κ-strong for A, meaning that for every λ < κ there is an embedding
j : V [G] → M [j(G)] with critical point γ such that A ∩ λ = j(A) ∩ λ. Such
an embedding can be found that is (λ + 1)-strong and induced by the canonical
extender, so by Lemma 9 we may assume thatM [j(G)] is closed under γ-sequences.
Further, such γ must be unbounded in κ, so we may consider some such γ above
the gap in the forcing. Thus, for A in the ground model, the Gap Forcing Theorem
shows that the restricted embedding j : V →M witnesses the λ-strongness of γ for
A in V , and so κ was a Woodin cardinal in V , as desired. Corollary
Define that a forcing notion is mild relative to κ when every set of ordinals
of size less than κ in the extension has a name of size less than κ in the ground
model. For example, the reverse Easton iterations one often finds in the literature
are generally mild because the tail forcing is usually sufficiently distributive, and so
any set of ordinals of size less than κ is added by some stage before κ. Additionally,
any κ-c.c. forcing is easily seen to be mild.
Corollary 16. Mild gap forcing creates no new strongly compact cardinals. If κ is
λ-strongly compact after forcing that is mild relative to κ and admits a gap below κ,
then it was λ-strongly compact in the ground model; and every strong compactness
measure in the extension is isomorphic to one that extends a strong compactness
measure from the ground model.
Proof: The point is that after mild forcing, every strong compactness measure
µ on Pκθ in the extension is isomorphic to a strong compactness measure µ˜ that
concentrates on (Pκθ)
V . To see why this is so, let j : V [G] → M [j(G)] be the
ultrapower by µ, and let s = [id]µ. Thus, j " θ ⊆ s ⊆ j(θ) and |s| < j(κ). By
mildness s has a name in M of size less than j(κ), and using this name we can
construct a set s˜ ∈ M such that j " θ ⊆ s˜ ⊆ j(θ) and |s˜| < j(κ) in M . Furthermore,
since µ is isomorphic to a measure concentrating on θ, there must be some ordinal
ζ < j(θ) such that M [j(G)] = { j(h)(ζ) | h ∈ V [G] }. I may assume that the largest
element of s˜ has the form 〈α, ζ 〉, using a suitable definable pairing function, by
simply adding such a point if necessary. Let µ˜ be the measure germinated by s˜
via j, so that X ∈ µ˜ ↔ s˜ ∈ j(X). Since s˜ is a subset of j(θ) of size less than
j(κ) in M , it follows that µ˜ is a fine measure on Pκθ in V [G] that concentrates
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on (Pκθ)
V . I will now show that µ and µ˜ are isomorphic. For this, it suffices by
the seed theory of [Ham97] to show that every element of M [j(G)] is in the seed
hull X = { j(h)(s˜) | h ∈ V [G] } ≺ M [j(G)] of s˜. By the choice of s˜ we know that
ζ ∈ X and so it is easy to conclude that j(h)(ζ) ∈ X for any function h ∈ V [G], as
desired. So every strong compactness measure is isomorphic to a strong compactness
measure that concentrates on (Pκθ)
V .
Now the corollary follows because the restricted embedding j ↾V : V →M must
be definable (with a name for µ as a parameter) in V by the Gap Forcing Theorem,
and using this embedding one can recover µ˜ ∩ V , which is easily seen to be a fine
measure on Pκθ in V , as desired. Corollary
Corollary 17. Gap forcing creates no new supercompact cardinals. Indeed, it does
not increase the degree of supercompactness of any cardinal. If κ is λ-supercompact
after forcing with a gap below κ, then κ was λ-supercompact in the ground model,
and further, every supercompactness measure in the extension extends a supercom-
pactness measure in the ground model.
Proof: If j : V [G] → M [j(G)] is the ultrapower by the λ-supercompactness
measure µ then the Gap Forcing Theorem implies that the restricted embedding
j : V →M is definable from parameters in V , and Lemma 8 implies that Mλ ⊆ M
in V . In particular, [id]µ = j "λ ∈ M , and so µ∩V must be in V , as desired. Corollary
Corollary 18. Gap forcing creates no new almost huge cardinals, huge cardinals,
or n-huge cardinals for any n ∈ ω.
Proof: This argument is just the same. If j : V [G] → M [j(G)] is an almost
hugeness or hugeness embedding in V [G], then the Gap Forcing Theorem implies
that the restricted embedding j : V → M is definable from parameters in V and
Lemma 8 shows that it is has the corresponding amount of hugeness there. Corollary
Let me close with the following observation.
Observation 19. The closure assumption on the embedding in the Gap Forc-
ing Theorem cannot be omitted, because if there are two normal measures on the
measurable cardinal κ in V then after merely adding a Cohen real x there is an
embedding j : V [x] → M [x] that does not lift an embedding from the ground
model.
Proof: Suppose that µ0 and µ1 are normal measures on κ in V and x is a V -
generic Cohen real. By the Levy-Solovay Theorem [LevSol67], these measures extend
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uniquely to measures µ¯0 and µ¯1 in V [x], and furthermore the ultrapowers by the
measures µ¯0 and µ¯1 in V [x] are the unique lifts of the corresponding ultrapowers
by µ0 and µ1 in V . Let j : V [x] → M [x] be the ω-iteration determined in V [x] by
selecting at the nth step either the the image of µ¯0 or of µ¯1, respectively, depending
on the nth digit of x. If 〈 κn | n < ω 〉 is the critical sequence of this embedding, then
for any X ⊆ κ the standard arguments show that κn ∈ j(X) if and only if X is in the
measure whose image is used at the nth step of the iteration. Suppose now towards
a contradiction that the restricted embedding j ↾ V is amenable to V . I will show
that from j ↾P (κ)V one can iteratively recover the digits of x. First, by computing
in V the set {X ⊆ κ | κ ∈ j(X) }, we learn which measure was used at the initial
step of the iteration and thereby also learn the initial digit of x. This information
also tells us the value of κ1 = jµx(0)(κ). Continuing, we can compute in V the set
{X ⊆ κ | κ1 ∈ j(X) } to know the next measure that was used and thereby learn the
next digit of x and the value of κ2, and so on. Thus, from j ↾P (κ)
V in V we would
be able to recursively recover x, contradicing the fact that x is not in V . Theorem
The argument works equally well with any small forcing; one simply uses a
longer iteration.
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